“and the bonanza ended”

Money was scarce and no one scorned pennies. Seeing the perspiring WA workers in the streets (created by presidential order in 1935, “Works Progress Administration” was the largest of FDR’s New Deal programs to provide useful work for the unemployed), I borrowed a nickel and bought a packet of Kool-Aid, from which I made six glasses that I sold to them for a penny each. I continued to do this and found that it took a lot of work to earn a few cents. But the next winter, when my father gave me a nickel to shovel the snow from our sidewalk, I hit a bonanza. I offered the same deal to our neighbors and, after an exhausting day of snow removal, returned home soaked in sweat and bearing the huge sum of a couple of dollars, almost half of what my father was paid per day. Soon lots of the kids were out following my lead and the bonanza ended-an early lesson in how competition can drive down profits.

Edward O. Thorp

A Man for All Markets: From Las Vegas to Wall Street, How I Beat the Dealer and the Market

Art Auction Markets

From an August 2023 interview between Tyler Cowen an Paul Graham.

We think of the market mechanism as an information network: What information is considered important? In the world of business, profits are the important information and alpha erodes. To be successful then, your important information should be secret from someone else. This can be done by obscuring your information or by elevating something else for the competition. In Graham’s case the elevated information is “fashionable contemporary crap”.

GRAHAM: It sounds weird, but if you look at where the money’s spent at auction, it’s almost all fashionable contemporary crap because if you think about how prices in very high-end art are set, they’re auction prices. How many people does it take to generate an auction price? Two. Just two. So, you have boneheaded Russianswho want to have a Picasso on their wall so people will think they’re legit, or hedge fund managers’ wives who’ve been told to buy impressive art to hang in their loft so when people come over, they’ll say, “Oh, look, they’ve got a Damien Hirst.”

The way art prices at the very high end are set is almost entirely by deeply bogus people, [laughs] which is great, actually. When I was an artist, I used to be annoyed by this. Now that I buy a lot of art at auction, I’m delighted because it means there’s all this money. You see Andy Warhol’s screen prints selling for $90 million.

COWEN: Yes. Old masters can be, I wouldn’t say cheap, but I would say radically underpriced.

GRAHAM: A couple hundred thousand.

COWEN: Or even less for some good ones.

GRAHAM: Yes, I know because I buy them. [laughs] I used to be annoyed by this, and now I think it’s the most delightful thing in the world because there’s all this loose money sloshing around, and so-called contemporary art is like this sponge that just absorbs all of it. There’s none left. Some of the things I buy, I am the only bidder. I get it for the reserve price. No one else in the world wants it, or even knows that it’s being sold, so I am delighted about this.

The answer to your question, which artists are undervalued? Essentially, all good artists. The very, very, very famous artists, artists famous enough for Saudis to have heard of them — Leonardo, I would say, is probably not undervalued. But except for the artists who are household names — every elementary school student knows their names — they’re all undervalued.

Competing Against Luck (book review)

Clayton Christensen developed The Innovator’s Dilemma to help established organizations understand that when they serve their most profitable customers it leaves them susceptible to innovators who enter the low-end of the market but serve the customers better and move up the market to become the newly established organization.

There’s also a solution.

Why were innovators successful?

They’re undercapitalized, under-experienced, and underwhelming relative to the established company.

The answer was Jobs To Be Done, told in Christensen’s et al. book Competing Against Luck.

Jobs is a way to describe the functional, social, and emotional progress a person wants to make in a given context.

Christensen’s work includes the milkshake example, where he and a team found that people bought milkshakes first thing in the morning. They ‘hired’ the shake to entertain them on the commute and provide some calories. They also finished before work so as not to be judged by their colleagues.

Christensen’s experiences included buying his son a milkshake. This is a different set of functional, social, and emotional progress a person wants to make in the context of being a dad in the afternoons.

This contrast is Jobs.

It’s work to find, but worth it. The process of understanding the job, the context, the progress, and all the parts creates a sustainable advantage (aka profits and avoidance of the market mechanism).

Think about Netflix. If a capitalized and connected Hollywood mogul wanted to compete with Netflix, they could buy all the streaming rights but that misses all the work: physical networks, social networks, technology, production, and so on.

Jobs exist for solutions to enduring and persistent problems. Snapchat was preceded by the IM, which was preceded by the extra-long telephone cord which was preceded by passing notes in class.

Kids talking to each other without adults’ oversight is an enduring and persistent problem.

A large example from the book covers the Southern New Hampshire University online program. Once the staff adopted a Jobs perspective they noticed two sets of customers.

The first was conventional high school graduates who wanted a conventional college experience.

The second was adult learners who needed information, training, and accreditation yesterday.

SNHU found the context was a parent alone at the kitchen table at night and looking for immediate information. Their functional progress was training and certification. Their emotional progress was as role models for their kids.

A university seems like a singular thing. But in the context of these two customers, it must act differently.

With hindsight, Jobs stories are obvious – and we’ve shared plenty – but to find them takes clustering data. The interviews are hard, especially relative to the alternative innovations of: cheaper, faster, sooner, shipped, or a different color.

Some clustering insights:

GM’s OnStar division listened to customer calls and found that it was people who were in an unfamiliar place and wanted to feel safe. OnStar wasn’t directions so much as security.

V8’s product manager saw things through the eyes of their customers who wanted to “eat” their fruits and vegetables. V8 is a juice whose competition isn’t in the juice aisle.

Intuit found that customers didn’t want tax optimization so much as tax minimization. Make this painless, fast, and damn sure I don’t get audited we don’t have time for that.

Along with Bob Moesta’s books, Competing Against Luck is the best introduction to Jobs. Though a touch academic, the sections are fast and full of examples and theories.

Picture Perfect Langauge

“It’s about having a conversation with the consumer,” said advertiser Linda Kaplan Thaler. In their language.

Legibility affects our understanding. In the alpha erosion, words mean competition and market mechanism posts we looked at this idea from a producer’s angle. If a business earns excess returns it attracts competition. It’s the non-repeatable processes that allow a business to remain dominant. That is, are the advantages legible to competitors?

Another application of this idea is product development. Customers hire jobs to be done to make progress in their lives and successful product development follows the legibility of customer wants.

Thaler recalls one night on The Johnny Carson Show when an actress commented about needing her camera for a “Kodak moment”.

I looked at my team and asked if we had used that before. No, everyone said, that’s brand new.

Bingo. That’s customer language. Linda’s team had the Kodak account and making Kodak moments legible is what they sold.

Successful businesses hide legibility from their competitors and find legibility in their customers.

Crazy Russian incentives

Around 1992 Russia privatized state companies. The government gave each citizen one voucher they could bring to an exchange for a share of that day’s company. A simple plan – until humans get involved.

Not all Russians wanted to own shares. Local markets emerged. A small fish bought all the vouchers in one neighborhood, a medium fish bought all the neighborhoods in a town, a large fish bought all the towns in a region. Eventually sacks of vouchers made it to the national exchanges.

Though unintended, these mini-markets worked. Free economies FTW. So far so good.

Each exchange had a schedule. A modern Monday might be 1,000 shares of Apple at nine, 200 of IBM at ten, 500 of Ford at eleven and so on. If only one person showed up Monday at nine they would get all the shares for their vouchers. It was the market mechanism at work. It’s cheaper (more valuable) to not bid against someone in an auction. When one companies shares went up they shut down the airport the day before their voucher offering. Another company ignited a tire fire on train tracks leading in and out of town.

Insiders were insistent on owning their companies because the valuations were way off. By one estimate, the voucher privatization program valued the entire Russian economy at ten billion dollars, or one sixth the market cap of Walmart. If you could buy a legitimate twenty dollar Amazon gift card for one dollar would you? Rather, how many? This economic transition was called a katastroika. A combination of the catastrophe and perestroika – Gorbachev’s politics.

George H. W. Bush has his last year as president, Achy Breaky Heart finishes the year as the fifteenth most played song, and there’s money to be made in Russia.

“I went to someone in the investment management division,” Bill Browder writes in Red Notice, “expecting him to hug me since I was sharing the most joyous jaw dropping investment opportunity he would ever see. Instead he looked at me as if I was suggesting the firm should invest in Mars.”
Russian privatization was a huge opportunity. Everyone at Salomon Brothers missed it. Why? Incentives.

On Browder’s first day, his first manager explained the system: generate five times your salary or you’re done.

“Nobody at Salomon Brothers could divorce themselves from their own narrow mindset. Perhaps if I had been more subtle and clever I could have pierced their myopia, but I wasn’t, I had no political skills. I presented my idea for weeks and weeks hoping that through repetition I would get through to someone.”

Incentives and culture form what people do when they’re not told what to do.

At the London office the formula – which worked wonderfully – was fees through consulting.

Eventually Browder’s repetition got through and he got a call from Bobby Ludwig in New York. Two days after a phone call with Ludwig, Browder pitched the idea. An hour later Ludwig delivered twenty-five million dollars and marching orders. At the New York office the formula for Bobby Ludwig was to make money.

When Browder returned to London he had to switch departments but couldn’t find a desk. “Bill, why are you bothering me with this?” Ludwig asked when Browder appealed to him, “If they won’t give you a desk just work from home, I don’t care where you work. This is about investing in Russia, not desks.”


There’s this idea that to understand what’s going on in the world someone has to know the history or stay on top of things. But sometimes we can come back to first principles. We’re all humans with incentives. Also, the Red Notice audiobook performance is amazing.

Russian Markets

Competition’s effect is the “market mechanism”. This example is from 1996 Russia.

Bill Browder is looking at stock in a Russian oil and gas company. The country’s companies have just become public, and though MNPZ has slightly smaller reserves than British Petroleum, it’s trading for 100x less. Why?

I was convinced that there must be some other explanation for the deep discount and spent the next several days searching for it.

Did the preferred shares have different par values? No. Was the ownership restricted to workers? No. Could the higher dividends be arbitrarily changed or canceled by the company? No. Did they represent only some minuscule part of the share capital? No. There was no explanation. The only reason I could fathom for why they were so cheap was that no one had showed up to ask about them-until I had.

Amazingly, I found that this anomaly wasn’t restricted to MNPZ.

Nearly every company in Russia had preferred shares and most of them traded at a huge discount to the ordinary shares. These things were a potential gold mine.

If there’s a name, there’s a market mechanism. If the invisible is now visible, there’s a market mechanism. If something is weird, new, unknown, secret, there may not be.

Pricing power evaporates with the heat of the market mechanism. Sometimes though, in the far reaches, someone can, find a gold mine.

Can someone be, like MKBHD?

Can someone become like you now Guy Raz asked Marques Brownlee?

It’s different today. “I’ve noticed that in polls of younger people their dream jobs used to be firefighter or movie star, but they all say YouTuber now”, said Marques, “this is fascinating to me because when I started that did not exist.”

If something is legible it’s something to compete on. But illegible things – becoming a YouTuber before it was a thing – make the competition harder.

Legible means playing according to the rules of the game. Illegible means making up the rules as you go. “I just wanted to make the kind of videos I liked to watch,” Marques notes. Illegible also means there’s time to find your rules. Brownlee spent years making videos. He admits that the early ones are hard to watch because they’re so bad. That’s fine!

With value comes competition, and the market mechanism whirls to life. “Your margin,” Bezos believed, “is my opportunity”. Alpha erodes.

Except in some places like the new, the foreign, the unaccounted, the unfavorable, the silly, and so on. Not every new thing ‘works out’ but every new thing has less competition.

Words hiding value

Patrick O’Shaughnessy asks Gaurav Kapadia what makes a great business. It’s all the basic stuff, “but really when you go down to it, if you look at a lot of the great businesses, they’ve created niche monopoly things. No one likes to say it because you’re not allowed to say it.” Kapadia lists at least four monopolies: cable companies, software companies, aircraft engine manufacturers, and medical device companies – but the real insight is no one is allowed to say it.

Names mean competition. If something is unaddressed with words it’s less available as thought and underpriced in cost (the market mechanism).

Our new dictionary series highlights the opposite end of Kapadia’s point. New words new thoughts.

Later Kapadia talks about diversity and inclusion in the investing industry. “I don’t think anyone’s heart is in the wrong place, I think everyone’s heart is in the right place. So we have to stipulate that, people really care, but so many decisions are made by the network. And so the only way you can break down existing network effects is with data.”

For words like monopoly the network has agreed on one meaning, and it’s mispricing. For words like diversity, the network has agreed on one meaning, and again it is mispriced.

The same week Mike Prada joined Wharton Moneyball and was asked a kind of ‘what’s next in basketball?’ question. One thing Prada pondered was what if Memphis is playing the next form of basketball? There’s no fast break or half court offense, only running. Types of offense thinking, like monopoly and diversity, hides value.

The invisible visible

In the beginning, we measured the world one way. Then another way came. This way offered different fidelity, and we used that. Sometimes the thing we measured was a fixed supply, and the new fidelity changed demand and prices. Then a new new way came. The first two examples are this. Sometimes there is is no supply constraint and no change in price. The second two examples are that.

Investing. There are at least two areas where the invisible became visible. One is quantitative. It’s in the numbers, not the stories, where good investments can be found. A second is in scale. It’s the size of the company where there’s information which is invisible at one scale but very clear at another.

Moneyball. Like quant investing, Moneyball is a way to use numbers to find patterns and to frame our thinking.

Personal. “You work with a lot of teams”, Shane Parrish prompted, “what have you learned about making good decisions?” Well, says Diana Chapman, “people don’t practice nearly enough candor.” The whole episode (#130) is basically about this, making the invisible visible in our collection of relationships. How? Through candor.

Jobs to be done. The JTBD framework is a way of articulating purchase decisions. People take action to change what? We’ve many examples of this: Leatherman tool, Headspace meditation, and Instagram stores.

One way to find the recently visible is in words. What was so great about Chapman’s podcast with Parrish was the embodiment of her ideas. Chapman is physical: use notecards, stand here, dress like this and act accordingly. We are a visual species. Today’s prompt then: What is invisible here?

Market Mechanism 2

Photo by Tirachard Kumtanom on Pexels.com

This is in addition to the previous post on the market mechanism. Briefly, it’s the idea that competition erodes the value captured by the producer.

Barry Ritholtz asked Morgan Housel about what he wished he knew when he started. Housel responded, “One thing that sticks out is that good investing is not about being good at something but you have to find something that other people are bad at. The fact that you are good at modeling does not necessarily make a difference because a lot of people are good at that.”

This, said Fredrik DeBoer, is part of the myth of college. One way to avoid the squeeze of the market mechanism is to have a rare skill. In Housel’s words, to be good at something other people are bad at. People are compensated by what they know, proxied by a degree, then a graduate degree. More degrees more (proxied) competition.

Success is found, said Hamilton Helmer, in the durable. “If you do something better, the question is, ‘How can this be durable?’ There has to be something that prevents others from taking all of that away from you.” How can you avoid the market mechanism creating a commodity?

It probably will happen too. Rufus Peabody said about gambling: “I used to bet second halves in college and professional football. That used to drive my yearly earnings, it was an ATM machine basically. But the last three years I’ve basically broke even there and may not continue running the models because the inefficiencies that were there are no longer there.”

Profits attract competition, competition drives profits and prices down. The market mechanism is Santa for the consumer and saboteur to the producer.

There’s one way to avoid the market mechanism; attract less competition.

Movies, wine, investing, and sports all offer financial and psychic income. That’s a double dose of the market mechanism once someone sniffs out the potential rewards. A cooler choice might be digging pools.